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I. Introduction
Hans Micklitz is, on many accounts, a renaissance scholar. Versed in scholarship across geographies, times and disciplines, with academic productivity that few can match. Despite his many pursuits, Hans has always been the most generous and committed supervisor. He has motivated his students to read broadly, think deeply and be ambitious in their scholarship. His thoughtful supervision has moved many of us beyond our intellectual boundaries: we remain deeply grateful to Hans for his guidance during the most vulnerable, and the most beautiful, period of our lives.
When we started thinking about this contribution, we asked what brings Hans, Keiva and Marija together? Two things sprang to mind. Firstly, our commonly held commitment to the EU project. While unquestionably critical observers of the EU, we all remain deeply concerned with its fate, intellectually and emotionally. It is for this reason that the CJEU's decision in Whitman and Others, 1 the most recent pronouncement on Brexit, issued mere weeks prior to the submission of this contribution, could not but form the object of our attention herein. Secondly, we also keenly remembered the piece of scholarship that Hans encouraged us to read and re-read -Duncan Kennedy's "Three Globalisations of Legal Thought" 2 -a piece that has ultimately found its way into the scholarship of all of us.
In this contribution then we, somewhat playfully, ask if there is anything we can learn from 1 Case C-621/18, Andy Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 2 D. Kennedy, "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850 -2000 ," The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (2006 .
reading Whitman and Others 3 through the prism of Kennedy's Three Globalisations of Legal Thought. In order to undertake this analysis, we will first, in Part II, set out the fundamental characteristics of Classical Legal Thought, The Social and Neo-Formalism. We then discuss the judgment Wightman and Others 4 , before proceeding to analyse the judgment in light of Kennedy's Three Globalisations in Part IV. The main issue that we aim to shed light on is the relation between law and politics in the EU after Wightman. We will explore different legal consciousnesses that seem to co-exist in this judgment, each of which re-establishes the relationship between law and politics in the EU.
II. The Three Globalisations of Legal Thought
Following Kennedy, our employment of 'globalisation of legal thought' conjures a historical legal consciousness, which includes a set of legal and political arguments and tools rendering that consciousness the intellectual background of legal argumentation -the langue of legal discourse.
A. Classical Legal Thought
During the heyday of Classical Legal Thought (CLT) -from approximately 1850 until 1914 5contractual thinking presented the blue print within which relations between individuals on the one hand as well as between countries on the other could be framed. CLT was characterized by a clear distinction between the public and the private, by individualism, and, interpretive formalism.
Contract law and will-theory stood in the center of this legal consciousness. In CLT, the contract and private law rules were a set of rational derivations from the first order principles: the individual and his will 6 were to be protected by governments as the rights of legal subject eventually to agreements accorded in line with their own preferred terms and conditions in disregard to potential power differentials. 8
B. The Social
The dissatisfaction that arose in revolt of CLT began to ferment in the late 1800s, and provided a forum which allowed for the embrace of a new legal consciousness, spreading from the "Western" hemisphere across the world. Beginning in the early 1900s therefore, and lasting until the end of World War II, a reconstruction process was set in motion based on fundamental shifts from individualism to the interdependence and group rights, from formal equality to social justice and from private law as its core to social legislation. The second globalisation embedded a collective element, protecting individuals as constitutive elements of particular groups of society. The social, in these terms, constituted an outright attack on the individualist nature of CLT.
We understand, therefore, the second globalization of legal thought as the development of a legal consciousness that bestrode the will of individuals, 9 and to some extent sovereign nations, paving the way for arguments pertaining to interdependence and cooperation. 10
Internally, in regulatory terms, the law of the free market was slowly replaced by a new regulatory regime where market freedoms were balanced against radiating social concerns that aimed at protecting groups in society e.g. workers, women, the disabled. In the international domain, the cooperation remained however hierarchical and exploitative -the League of Nations and Mandate system was succeeded by the United Nations, Bretton Woods, and a (failed) attempt to create World Trade Organisation. Colonialism and economic exploitation in international proved much slower to wane. 11 C. Neo-formalism 8 Indeed, it was for the above reasons that the imperialism of contract was a construct that held significant theoretical and practical weight during the first gloablisation. In essence, everything was considered in a contractual light and therefore reduced to elements of a transaction -the will of the actors was key. According to The Will Theory, commitments made between parties to a contract were enforceable before courts because the parties freely chose to be bound by the contractual agreement. 9 Take for example, the development of labour law around which a legal langue aiming to reign-in the freedom of contract ideology and the regulation of private relations based solely on the will of the parties was developed. In this regard, we note that although freedom of contract remained intact, the Social paved the way for the imposition of obligations on, for example, employers, obligations essentially based on the recognition of social responsibilities and the development of the idea of social protection. 10 Kennedy, "The Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought". 11 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, vol. 37 (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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Neo-formalism grew from an increased importance weighted on human and democratic rights, the rule of law, across the world. This third globalization, what Kennedy refers to as the contemporary period, is more concerned with recognising and managing difference. In Kennedy's own words:
Between 1945 and 2000, one trend was to think about legal technique, in the aftermath of the critiques of CLT and the social, as the pragmatic balancing of conflicting considerations in administering the system created by the social jurists. At the same time, there was a seemingly contrary trend to envisage law as the guarantor of human and property rights and of intergovernmental order through the gradual extension of the rule of law, understood as judicial supremacy. 12
The langue of neo-formalism saw a shift from individual rights and property rights that characterized the first globalization, and from group rights and social rights that marked the globalization of the social consciousness, to an increased focus on human rights in terms of policy analysis, policy making and, more importantly for our scope here, adjudication.
To sum up, during the CLT the langue was based on a formalistic consensus of wills, the rights of individuals/states and a disregard of power disparities or vulnerability. During the second globalisation, the Social, more room was made for collective considerations and instrumental approaches to law, for social justice and protection. Towards the end of the Social, we see the emergence of an identity-based notion of rights, marking the beginning of the neo-formalist legal consciousness. During the spread of Neo-Formalism, the social project is reintegrated into the legal discourse at the level of arguments about constitutional rights and balancing policy and identity. In this legal consciousness, political disputes are portrayed as legal disputes about the scope of one's rights, taking social justice into account as part of identity rights.
III. Wightman and Others
On the 10 December 2018, the CJEU, in the context of a preliminary reference referred by the Council and should be adopted in accordance with national constitutional requirements. He notes the potential for abuse recalling that it is limited by the principles of good faith and sincere The judgment proceeds to examine the substance of the dispute before it noting that despite Article 50's the silence on revocation of withdrawal from the Union, that same Article 50, in paragraph 2, refers explicitly to the notification of the 'intention' to withdraw. The Court notes that such an 'intention' can neither be definitive nor irrevocable 24 and is supported by the fact that Article 50 (1) provides for unilateral withdrawal dependent solely on the sovereign choice of the Member State concerned. 25 In delineating the purpose of Article 50, the Court notes its two objectives, firstly, to enshrine the sovereign right of a Member State to withdraw from the EU, and secondly, to ensure that such a withdrawal takes places in an orderly fashion. 26 globalization, The Social, on the other hand, was typified by an understanding of 'law as the extension of politics'. Law in this period was overlain with an increased awareness of social obligations and the idea of social protection. When we come to the third globalization, Neoformalism, we witness a change in legal grammar in an attempt to integrate 'politics in/through law', via rights discourse and the emergence of identity rights.
Upon a first reading, Wightman reverts to the langue of the CLT. The importance the Court gives to will, and the sovereignty of the Member State in question, is remarkable. The Court specifically notes, in paragraphs 65-66 that "In those circumstances, given that a State cannot be forced to accede to the European Union against its will, neither can it be forced to withdraw from the European Union against its will. However, if the notification of the intention to withdraw were to lead inevitably to the withdrawal of the Member State concerned from the European Union at the end of the period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU, that Member State could be forced to leave the European Union despite its wish -as expressed through its democratic process in accordance with its constitutional requirements -to reverse its decision to withdraw and, accordingly, to remain a Member of the European Union.". This is a clear expression of a Member State's freedom and autonomy -States are free to join the Union, and they are free to leave. Therefore, Article 50 should be interpreted in such a way that any intention to leave the Union can be revoked in a unilateral fashion.
Yet there is another level of argument at play: in paragraphs 61, 62 and 64, immediately before pronouncing its opinion on the notification of intention to withdraw, the Court states that " These three paragraphs of the judgment seem to catapult the discussion into the political field.
By saying that Article 50, a provision that at first sight seems to be of a purely procedural nature, should be interpreted in light of the overall aim of the Union as expressed in the the nationals of the Member States as the addressees. In more recent times though, and as can be deciphered from the judgment, the latter has developed into a status that weakens the market dependency element and rather sees a concept develop which produces its own legal effects.
In Wightman, and despite the opposition of the European Commission and the Council, and in an even more unequivocal fashion than the Advocate General, the Court moves to judge on the one hand with a clear CLT consciousness but, with reference to essential elements of the European project thereby rather recalling the legal-political consciousness of the Social.
Indeed, by setting the scene for a possible unilateral revocation that unshackles national politics from supranational constrains (i.e. the agreement of the European Council) the Court gives large space to national politics, more voice to the British citizens and also ensures that the least number of constraints are placed on making sure that EU citizens remain so.
The Court takes this recognition even further, when in another conspicuously anti-neoformalist move, the CJEU refuses to place additional legal safeguards against the abuse of the right to unilateral revocation, such as those for instance suggested by the AG. While the revocation of the 'intention to withdraw' has to be a genuine expression of EU citizens to remain in the EU, the quality of consent is not framed in legal terms of good faith and sincere cooperation, but rather left on the backdrop of political trust in the EU-British citizens and their constitutional procedures.
V. Conclusion
The Wightman and Others judgment may be a special case in the EU jurisprudence. In view of the pending Brexit, we can safely say that the EU may be at its lowest point for what concerns its pursuit of 'the ever closer union'. Yet, it is perhaps at this moment that EU law is at its best.
Firstly, in rejecting the stance of the Commission and the Council on the form any revocation must take, the Court casts away any assumed position of strength the latter may have vis-à-vis the UK. Secondly, the Court, by embedding the discussion about UK sovereignty in the language of EU values and EU citizenship, manages to assert the extensiveness of the UK's sovereign rights within the context of the extensiveness of the political and democratic rights of EU-British citizens. Finally, the Court also makes clear that this status cannot be taken
